Научный семинар Международной лаборатории макроэкономического анализа: Владимир Щукин "Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage"
Уважаемые коллеги,
В четверг 03 июня в 16:00 состоится научный семинар Международной лаборатории макроэкономического анализа НИУ ВШЭ.
В рамках семинара Владимир Щукин (НИУ ВШЭ) представит доклад «Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage»
Аннотация:
Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote buying are clientelist practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, prior to election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment which can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show that when the politician can use both clientelist instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost for clientelism in terms foregone future taxes declines. As a result, equilibrium amount of public investment is typically lower when both tools are available than otherwise.
Рабочий язык- английский
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