Научный семинар Международной лаборатории макроэкономического анализа и Научно-учебной лаборатории макроструктурного моделирования экономики России: Владимир Щукин "Political Economy of Industrialization"

Уважаемые коллеги,

В четверг 30 января в 16:00 состоится совместный научный семинар Международной лаборатории макроэкономического анализа и Научно-учебной лаборатории макроструктурного моделирования экономики России.

В рамках семинара Владимир Щукин (CERGE-EI, Charles University) представит доклад «Political Economy of Industrialization».

Аннотация доклада:

Industrialization was essential for the transition from Malthusian stagnation to a modern growth regime. However, initially, the landowning political elite did not promote industrial development, they in fact restrained it in order to maintain their political power and high land rent. In contrast, in the second half of the 19th century, in some economies the landowning elite encouraged industrialization.

In this paper, I propose a theory that explains this change in the landowning elite’s behavior. I argue that this elite used public investment (e.g. railroad construction, accumulation of human capital) as a strategic response to the threat of a coalition forming between workers and capitalists against the prevailing political regime. Specifically, increased public investment generated two critical effects. First, it enhanced the productivity of the industrial sector, thereby increasing capital income and augmenting capitalists’ wealth. Greater wealth among capitalists translated into heightened potential losses from redistributive policies should political power shift to the working class, who might implement high taxation.

Second, I demonstrate that sufficiently elevated public investment reduced the appeal of political change for capitalists in terms of securing pro-industrial economic reforms (e.g., abolition of serfdom, reduction of business restrictions). Assuming that landowners held some economic interest in industrialization (e.g., for military or strategic purposes), public investment served as a commitment device for maintaining pro-industrial economic institutions. This occurred because high levels of public investment increased the positive impact of pro-industrial institutions on the income of the elite. When public investment reached a certain threshold, pro-industrial institutions became advantageous to the elite, leading them to adopt such policies. Consequently, capitalists aligned with the elite to preserve the status quo, enabling landowning elites to consolidate their political power. I support my theory with historical evidence from the Second French Empire, the German Empire, Imperial Russia, and Imperial Japan.

Рабочий язык: английский

Формат проведения:  онлайн

Ссылка для подключения  https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81956248422

Идентификатор конференции: 819 5624 8422

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